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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
BRAD H.HANSEN : Case No. 20010586-SC 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
INTRODUCTION 
In ordering the prosecutor to review Ms. Powell's psychological records, the trial 
judge violated Mr. Hansen's due process right to in-camera review of those records. In 
its brief, the State attempts to shift the blame for the violation of this right from the trial 
judge to Mr. Hansen. Specifically, the State claims that Mr. Hansen waived his right to 
in-camera review by inviting the trial judge to err. To the contrary, Mr. Hansen requested 
specific psychological records, the contents of which had a reasonable likelihood of 
including exculpatory evidence about Ms. Powell's perception, memory, and veracity. 
Because the trial judge erred and not Mr. Hansen, the inviting-the-error doctrine has no 
application here. Mr. Hansen more than adequately preserved the trial judge's error and 
that error now requires correction on appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DENIED MR. HANSEN HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO IN-CAMERA REVIEW 
OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S PSYCHOLOGICAL 
RECORDS 
Contratry to the State's assertions, Mr. Hansen more than adequately preserved the 
trial judge's refusal to review the psychological records in camera. Mr. Hansen 
thoroughly instructed the judge on the law and gave the judge a full opportunity to 
correctly apply it. When presented with this information, the trial judge misconstrued the 
law and ordered the prosecutor to review the psychological records. In no sense did Mr. 
Hansen waive this issue by intentionally inviting the judge to err. Rather, the trial judge 
violated Mr. Hansen's constitutionally-protected right to in-camera review. 
A. Mr. Hansen Preserved For Appeal the Denial 
of In-Camera Review of Specifically Requested 
Psychological Records 
The record reveals that trial counsel preserved the denial of in-camera review. To 
preserve an issue for appeal, generally Ma contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record." 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). The purpose for this rule is two-fold. 
First, "in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity 
to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 
2 
36 (Utah), cert, denied 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Second, requiring a contemporaneous 
objection precludes counsel from foregoing obje uons "as part of a trial strategy that 
counsel thinks will enhance the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy 
fails, . . . claim[ing] on appeal that the Court should reverse[.]" State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 
155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied 497 U.S. 1024 (1990); see State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 
937, 939 (Utah 1996). 
Here, Mr. Hansen provided the trial judge more than an adequate opportunity to 
consider the applicable law and to determine whether the judge was constitutionally 
required to review Ms. Powell's treatment records in camera. Mr. Hansen filed a motion 
specifically citing the relevant case law and explaining that he had a due process right to 
in-camera review of the psychological records. R. 42-61. Then, at a hearing on the 
motion, trial counsel specifically identified the case law and the factual basis requiring in-
camera review. R. 173. 
This Court's preservation rules required Mr. Hansen to do nothing more. In State 
v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, f7, 992 P.2d 951, the defendant filed a motion in limine to 
exclude all evidence of bad acts occurring before the period charged in the Information. 
The trial court denied the motion and required the defendant to object at trial to any 
specific prior acts admitted at trial. IcL This Court ruled that the trial judge erred in 
requiring specific objections at trial because the motion in limine "clearly brought the 
issue . . . to the trial court's attention." Id at ^ f 19. Specifically, the trial court's ruling 
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"made unnecessary any further objection to that type of evidence by defense counsel so as 
to be able to raise the issue of the validity of the order on appeal." Id, 
Similaxly, in State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 783 (Utah 1992), trial counsel 
requested the trial judge to dismiss a charge following the end of the State's case. IdL 
The trial judge reserved ruling on the motion until he could review the entire record. IdL 
Trial counsel then proceeded with the defense case. Id, The State claimed on appeal that 
the defendant waived this issue by proceeding with his case. Id This Court rejected the 
State's claim and ruled that if defendants properly raise a challenge to an issue below, 
they need not "take exception to a trial court's erroneous ruling in order to preserve the 
issue on appeal." Id, As the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide, criminal 
defendants need not repeatedly remind judges of their erroneous rulings if they have 
"state[d] [their] objections to the actions of the court and the reasons therefor." Utah R. 
Crim. Proc. 20. Rather, this Court concluded that the defendant need only "raise the 
claims at the appropriate time at the trial level, so the trial judge has an opportunity to rule 
on the issue." L± 
Moreover, this Court has ruled further that parties need not object at trial or renew 
an objection to a pretrial motion to suppress when the same judge presides at both the 
motion hearing and at trial. State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Utah 1987).1 
!This Court overruled Johnson on unrelated grounds in State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 
484, 489 (Utah 1997). This Court then overruled Doporto in State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 
57, [^15, 993 P.2d 837. Despite these competing decisions, Johnson's holding on the 
4 
Here, the same judge presided at both the motion hearing and at trial. R. 173-75. This 
rule applies with particular force to motions for in-camera review of witness 
psychological records given trial judges' duty to "conduct[] an ongoing review" of the 
materiality of treatment records throughout the trial, even when a different judge presides 
at the pretrial motion hearing. State v. Martin. 1999 UT 72, }^19, 984 P.2d 975. Thus, 
motions for in-camera review of witness psychological records presents an even stronger 
case for not requiring renewal of the motion than in cases involving suppression hearings. 
As these cases show, Mr. Hansen undeniably preserved his request for in-camera 
review when he filed a pretrial motion and argued the merits of the motion at a pretrial 
hearing. Like the defendants in Saunders, Emmett and Johnson. Mr. Hansen gave the 
trial judge had ample opportunity to correctly rule on his requests. 
B. Mr, Hansen Had a Constitutional Right to In-
Camera Review of the Psychological Records 
Due process of law required the trial judge to review Ms. Powell's psychological 
records in camera. Mr. Hansen sufficiently showed a reasonable likelihood that Ms. 
Powell's psychological disorders affected her memory, perception, and veracity. Thus, 
Pennsylvania v.Ritchie. 480 U.S. 39 (1987), and State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51, 982 P.2d 
79, constitutionally required the trial judge to review the records in camera himself rather 
preservation issue remains sound law. 
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than delegating that duty to the prosecutor. 
Criminal defendants have a due process right to in-camera review of a witness's 
psychological records whenever they "show with reasonable certainty that exculpatory 
evidence exists which would be favorable to [the] defense.'1 Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ft30, 
982 P.2d 79. Mr. Hansen more than adequately met this burden. He had specific 
knowledge that Ms. Powell had been treated for ADHD, depression, and anxiety and was 
taking medication at the time of the alleged rape for these disorders. R. 173: 7, 17-18. 
Discovery, provided by the State, revealed medical records that referred to Ms. Powell's 
treatment at Wasatch Canyons Counseling Center. R. 49; 98-99; 173: 17-18. Ms. Powell 
admitted at the preliminary hearing that she had received such treatment. R. 173: 18. 
Armed with tliis information, Mr. Hansen argued that the treatment records were 
necessary to develop his defense of consent because Ms. Powell's psychological 
problems and her medications ffinterfere[d] with her ability to accurately perceive events 
and her ability to accurately recall and relay" them. R. 173: 18. 
Mr. Hansen had well-founded concerns about Ms. Powell's mental acuity. 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition 
(1994) ("DSM-IV"), the diagnostic criteria for ADHD include appearing to frequently fail 
to "listen," becoming "easily distracted by extraneous stimuli," and being "often forgetful 
in daily activities." DSM-IV at 84. Similarly, persons suffering from major depression 
have "difficulty thinking, concentrating, or making decisions." Id at 320. Depressed 
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persons may also "appear easily distracted or complain of memory difficulties." Id at 
322. Generalized Anxiety Disorder, likewise, causes "difficulty concentrating" and 
relaxing. IcL at 433. Persons with this disorder also find "it difficult to keep worrisome 
thoughts from interfering with attention to tasks at hand and . . . stopping the 
worrfisome]" thoughts. IdL 
By definition, all three of these disorders potentially interfered with Ms. Powell's 
ability to perceive and encode information correctly and then to accurately recall it later. 
As this Court has ruled, "[ejvidence showing a witness's inability to perceive, recall, or 
relate events at issue in a trial may be crucial to establishing the truth." State v. Bakalov. 
1999 UT 45, p 2 , 979 P.2d 799. "Evidence of mental illness is material when it 'may 
reasonably cast doubt on the ability or willingness of a witness to tell the truth.'" Id. 
(quoting United States v. Smith. 77 F.3d 511, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The disclosure of 
this type of evidence is especially important when, as here, "the prosecution rests much of 
its case on th[e] [mentally ill] witness's testimony." Id 
All of Ms. Powell's mental disorders had a reasonable likelihood of affecting her 
perception, concentration, memory, and veracity. Because Mr. Hansen satisfied CardalPs 
threshold showing, the trial judge was constitutionally bound to review Ms. Powell's 
mental health records in camera. 
The State distorts the trial court record when it claims that Mr. Hansen "was not 
certain the requested records even existed." State's Brief at 13. To the contrary, trial 
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counsel specifically requested Ms. Powell's records of therapy sessions prior to the 
alleged rape. R. 173: 7. Counsel knew the records existed based on Ms. Powell's 
preliminary hearing testimony and the discovery that the State had provided. R. 173: 7, 
17-18. These records showed that Ms. Powell suffered from ADHD, depression, and 
anxiety, and that she was taking medication for these disorders at the time of the alleged 
rape. R. 173: 18. Trial counsel also requested Ms. Powell's records of her therapy 
sessions occurring after the alleged rape. R. 173: 7. But, trial counsel conceded that she 
had no specific knowledge that such records existed. R. 173: 7. Rather, she reasoned that 
a person who claimed to have been raped likely would have discussed that event with her 
therapist. R. 173: 7, 25-26. 
The record refutes the State's implication that trial counsel merely speculated that 
therapy records existed. Although counsel admitted that she was not aware of the 
contents of therapy sessions occurring after the alleged rape, she had specific, detailed 
knowledge that Ms. Powell was being treated for several psychological disorders at the 
time of the incident. There was no dispute that this specific information existed because 
the prosecutor and Ms. Powell herself produced that information. The trial judge 
overlooked these facts and concluded that Mr. Hansen had only made a speculative, 
"general" request for records. R. 173: 27. In making this ruling, the trial judge appears to 
have confused trial counsel's requests for pre-incident records with the post-incident 
records. R. 173:27-28. 
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The trial judge was constitutionally required to review the records even if Mr. 
Hansen could not conclusively establish their materiality. In Bakalov, this Court forbade 
prosecutors from substituting their judgment for the defendant's whenever the question of 
materiality "is at all close." Id at fl38. Rather, any "doubts should be resolved in favor of 
disclosure." Id Favoring disclosure is particularly appropriate when considering witness 
psychological records. Because criminal defendants lack direct access to such records, 
they have limited ability to establish the materiality of the evidence. Commonwealth v. 
Bishop, 617 N.E.2d 990, 996 n.6 (Mass. 1993). Although some minimal showing of 
relevancy is needed, courts should "resolv[e] any doubt in favor of in-camera review to 
compensate for defendants' inaccessibility to the evidence. Id at 995, 998. This 
approach properly respects the defendant's due process right to obtain exculpatory 
evidence. Id. at 995. 
The evidence presented at trial eliminated any doubt about the materiality of Ms. 
Powell's psychological records. Ms. Powell's strange behavior, conflicting versions of 
the incident, and apparent disdain for the truth cast serious doubt on her mental stability, 
memory, and veracity. In fact, Ms. Powell's strange behavior was fully consistent with 
her mental illnesses. She exhibited severe anxiety when Mr. Hansen's mother telephoned 
her and she was afraid to speak even after several promptings. R. 175: 189-90. Ms. 
Powell's repeated telephone calls to Mr. Hansen throughout the evening further showed 
her extreme anxiety over Mr. Hansen and her dependence on him. R. 175: 191-92. 
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Likewise, Ms. Powell repeatedly demonstrated impulsiveness, a by-product of 
ADHD. DSM-IV at 84. When she met Mr. Hansen's step-father for the first time she 
immediately hugged him and expressed her desire to be his daughter-in-law someday. R. 
175: 205. Then, when meeting Mr. Hansen's mother for the first time she easily took 
offense at the mother's advice and blurted out that she had already engaged in sexual 
relations with Mr. Hansen. R. 175: 196. DSM-IV identifies "blurt[ing] out answers 
before questions have been completed" as a diagnostic criteria for ADHD. DSM-IV at 
84. And, Mr. Hansen's reports that Ms. Powell would suddenly act bizarrely and even try 
to hit him is consistent with the ADHD symptoms of "low frustration tolerance [and] 
temper outbursts." DSM-IV at 80. 
The State counters that this Court cannot consider evidence presented at trial in 
reviewing the denial of the motion for in-camera review because this information was not 
before the trial judge. State's Brief at 19 n.4. The State's analysis is faulty on several 
levels. First of all, the same judge who presided over the motion hearing also presided at 
trial. The trial judge, thus, heard all of the evidence about Ms. Powell's bizarre behavior 
and disregard for the truth. Further, because the trial judge had a duty to "conduct[] an 
ongoing review" of the materiality of Ms. Powell's treatment records, even at trial, the 
State cannot complain that all of the evidence was not before the trial judge. State v. 
Martin, 1999 UT 72,1119, 984 P.2d 975. 
In any event, the cases the State cites do not support its proposition that "an 
10 
appellate court may affirm, but will not reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the 
district court at the time it ruled." State's Brief at 19 n.4. Two cases the State cites hold 
that if new evidence on the constitutionality of a detention emerges following a 
suppression hearing, the challenger must raise the new evidence to give the trial court an 
opportunity to consider it. United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722. 724 (DC. Cir 1993); 
Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Md. Spec. App. 1994). But, Mr. Hansen's case is 
distinguishable because criminal defendants generally have no knowledge of or access to 
the contents of witness psychological records. Thus, even if they learn new information 
about a witness, they lack the resources to link that information to evidence contained in 
treatment records. It would be unfair, inefficient, and impractical to require defendants to 
repeatedly object to unknown information every time they learn something new about a 
witness. For that very reason, prosecutors and trial judges have a continuing duty to 
review psychological records for exculpatory evidence. Martin, 1999 UT 72, [^19, 984 
P.2d 975. 
Several cases that the State cites actually hold that M[t]he entire record is 
considered on appeal which includes evidence . . . . at trial" when reviewing the denial of 
a pretrial motion. United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir.), cert, denied 510 
U.S. 1002 (1993); see United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 1240 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Basev, 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); State v. Kong, 883 P.2d 
686, 688 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Young, 576 So. 2d 1048, 1054 n.l (La. Ct. App. 
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1991); State v. Duncan. 879 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). The remaining cases 
limit their review to the evidence before the trial court at the time the motion was 
decided, but, they do not specifically address whether an appellate court can also rely on 
evidence produced at trial. Baez v. State. 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) 
(refusing to consider warrant produced after oral argument in appellate court); State v. 
Ryder. 315 N.W.2d 786, 788-89 (Iowa 1982) (limiting review to motion because 
appellant failed to produce suppression hearing transcript); Commonwealth v. Powers. 
398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 1979) (not addressing preliminary hearing transcript). The 
State's arguments are baseless. 
Because Mr. Hansen requested specific records that had a reasonable likelihood of 
revealing material information about Ms. Powell's mental acuity and veracity, the trial 
judge erred in denying in-camera review. Ritchie. 480 U.S. at 60; Cardall 1999 UT 51, 
P 0 , 982 P.2d 79. This Court should, thus, remand this matter for such a review. 
C. Because Mr, Hansen Preserved His Challenege 
to the Denial of In-Camera Review, He Did Not 
Waive His Right to Appellate Review 
Further contrary to the State's claims, trial counsel did not waive the challenge to 
the denial of in-camera review by failing to renew his motion. The State misconstrues the 
waiver doctrine when it claims that trial counsel "affirmatively]" waived the right to 
appellate review. State's Brief at 14. This Court has ruled that "if a party through 
12 
counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court 
into error, we will then decline to save that part} iiom the error" and refuse to even 
review the appeal for plain error. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158. But, this approach, called the 
invited error doctrine, only applies if the failure to object resulted from "a consciously 
chosen strategy of trial counsel rather than an oversight." LdL at 158-59; see United States 
v. Olano. 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993) (distinguishing between merely failing to object 
and intentionally forfeiting a known right); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 
1987) (defendants can only "consciously," "actively," or "affirmatively" waive right to 
appellate review). This doctrine, thus, penalizes parties for "tactical strategy" but not for 
"innocent omissions." Robert J. Labrum, Comment, History and Application of the Plain 
Error Doctrine in Utah, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 537, 550-51. 
No invited error occurred here. In the first place, that doctrine has no application 
because, as explained above, Mr. Hansen filed a proper, timely motion for in-camera 
review. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59. Second, Mr. Hansen did not mislead or 
"manipulate the court" into committing error. Labrum, 2000 Utah L. Rev. at 550. 
Rather, he cited the applicable law and properly presented his arguments for in-camera 
review. The trial judge then considered the arguments and erroneously concluded that 
Mr. Hansen had only made a general, speculative request for information. Thus, Mr. 
Hansen engaged in no manipulation or misleading. Moreover, the cases the State cites to 
support its claim of invited error do not apply because the defendant in each of those 
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cases either strategically failed to object or relied at trial on the same evidence challenged 
on appeal. State's Brief at 14-15 (citing Sate v. Laffertv, 2001 UT 19, 20 P.3d 342, cert, 
denied 122 S Ct. 542 (2001) (defendant could not complain of lack of notice of experts' 
reports because he did not provide notice of his own experts' reports); State v. Harmon, 
956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah 1998) (defendant made tactical decision not to request a curative 
instruction); Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah), cert, denied 513 U.S. 966 
(1994) (defendant's reliance on sworn statement precluded review of the statement); 
Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159 (involving "conscious strategy'1 to attack quality of state's 
evidence rather than oppose admission of that evidence); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 
561 (Utah 1987) (defendant ,finitiate[d]" erroneous argument that he could be paroled if 
given a life sentence)). 
Third, the State has not even attempted to infer any "conceivable strategic 
purpose" for not renewing the motion for in-camera review. State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 
937, 939 (Utah 1996). Because this case involved a classic "he said," she said" situation, 
Mr. Hansen's only defense was to attack Ms. Powell's veracity and credibility. Declining 
to seek access to the psychological records and miss discovering potentially exculpatory 
information would not have "enhance[d] [Mr. Hansen's] chances of acquittal." Bullock, 
791 P.2d at 159. Rather, the only reasonable inference from counsel's decision not to 
further request the psychological records, was that once the prosecutor represented that 
the records contained no exculpatory evidence, trial counsel believed that there was 
14 
nothing for her to request the trial judge to review. 
The State, nevertheless, complains that Mr. Hansen should have renewed the 
motion for in-camera review because the trial judge offered to "'revisit'" the issue after 
the prosecutor reviewed the psychological records. State's Brief at 14 (quoting R. 173: 
28). The State misunderstands the trial judge's ruling. The trial judge initially erred in 
finding that Mr. Hansen had not made a specific request for information. R. 173: 28. 
Instead, he ordered the prosecutor to "determine whether these records do exist." R. 173: 
28. If the prosecutor found any psychological records, she was to "review those and 
determine what evidence, if any, [is] appropriate to the claim or defense." R. 173: 28. 
The trial judge then ruled that if the parties found "further issue on this or some 
point of disagreement in some of these records that you suspect or find do exist, [trial 
counsel] can come back, and I will revisit that, probably in an in-camera review." R. 173: 
28. Trial counsel then requested the prosecutor to prepare an index of the records found 
to create "an adequate record, should we need to have an appellate court review" the 
prosecutor's determination. R. 173: 28. The trial judge agreed to order the prosecutor to 
prepare the index. R. 173: 29. 
Finally, the prosecutor reviewed the psychological records for therapy sessions 
occurring both before and after the alleged rape and concluded that the records contained 
nothing "exculpatory" or "relevant." R. 98; Addendum. The prosecutor identified the 
dates of the therapy sessions and disclosed the doctors' notes that listed the medications 
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that Ms. Powell was taking. R. 100-02. She concealed, however, the doctors' other 
notes, including a history of Ms. Powell's mental illnesses. R. 98-102. 
As these facts establish, the trial judge only allowed trial counsel to "revisit" the 
request for in-camera review if, after the prosecutor's review, the parties found "further 
issue on this or some point of disagreement in some of these records." R. 173: 28. But, 
based on the prosecutor's representations and her limited disclosures, no basis existed 
upon which trial counsel could revisit her motion or disagree with the prosecutor's 
conclusions. Based on the judge's explicit order, there were no grounds for trial counsel 
to request the trial judge to conduct an in-camera review. 
If anything, the hearing on the motion for in-camera review reveals that trial 
counsel thoroughly preserved the record for appeal. Recognizing that the trial judge's 
erroneous ruling created an appealable issue, she asked the judge to order the preparation 
of an index to assist this Court on appeal. Trial counsel apparently realized that because 
the trial judge had denied her access to the records, she hoped to provide something to 
facilitate appellate review. Trial counsel did all she could reasonably do to preserve the 
denial of the motion for in-camera review for this Court's consideration. Rather than 
penalizing trial counsel as the State suggests, this Court should commend counsel for her 
diligence in creating an adequate record for appeal. 
The State implies further that this Court's recent opinion in State v. Cramer, 2002 
UT 9, 44 P.3d 690, required Mr. Hansen to renew his motion for in-camera review. 
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State's Brief at 21. The State's partial quotation of Cramer inaccurately portrays this 
Court's ruling in that case. The full quotation reveals that this Court merely held that 
Ritchie and Cardall provide for in-camera review of potentially material witness 
psychological records but they do not allow criminal defendants direct access them: 
Cramer further contends that because his requests were 
sufficiently "specific," he was entitled to direct access to M.L.'s 
medical records under Ritchie. Cramer misinterprets Ritchie. 
Although "a defendant ... aware of specific information 
contained in [a] file [containing privileged records]... is free to 
request it directly from the court, and argue in favor of its 
materiality," Ritchie. 480 U.S. at 60, 107 S.Ct. 989 (emphasis 
added), this does not automatically entitle the defendant to 
receive the requested records: the court must still assess whether 
the records are indeed material. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n. 
15,59-60, 107 S.Ct. 989: State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51, ffl| 33-
35, 982 P.2d 79 (noting that defendant "specifically requested 
that the trial court review" certain records). 
Cramer. 2002 UT 9, |28 n.3, 44 P.3d 690. 
Contrary to the State's implications, this quotation fails to address the invited error 
doctrine, at all. Rather, it merely confirms that defendants do not have a right to direct 
access to witnesses' psychological records. To secure their due process right to in-camera 
review defendants must, instead, request the trial judge to review potentially exculpatory 
records. Because Mr. Hansen requested the trial judge for in-camera review of specific 
information that reasonably likely contained material information, he secured his right to 
in-camera review. Cardall 1990 UT 51, p o , 982 P.2d 79. 
Regardless of the characterization of the record below, this Court should only 
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apply the invited error doctrine when certain that counsel has engaged in misconduct. 
Because invited error results in the drastic loss of even plain error review of constitutional 
rights, this Court should only find a waiver when the record reveals "a consciously chosen 
strategy of tnal counsel rather than an oversight." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59. 
"
c[E]very reasonable presumption should be made against the waiver, especially when it 
relates to a right or privilege deemed so valuable as to be secured by the Constitution.'" 
State v. Johnson. 611 N.E.2d 414, 418 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Simmons v. State. 
79 N.E. 555, 557 (Ohio 1906)). When in doubt, "it would be better to upset the system 
than to allow an innocent person to be punished." Labrum, 2000 Utah L. Rev. at 553. 
Because the record reveals no indication of any strategic "maneuvering," the invited error 
doctrine has no application in this case. Id at 573. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hansen requests this Court to remand this matter to the trial court and to order 
the trial judge to review Ms. Powell's psychological records for exculpatory evidence in 
camera. 
SUBMITTED this ^ day of May, 2002. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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